The prosecution’s case against former National Signals Bureau (NSB) Director-General Kwabena Adu-Boahene and his co-accused over the alleged GH¢49.1 million financial loss to the State faces several evidential questions arising from the prosecution’s own witnesses and exhibits.
At the centre of the case are three cheques of GH¢27.1 million, GH¢1 million and GH¢21 million totalling GH¢49.1 million, connected with an account at Fidelity Bank, and subsequent payments to an account at Universal Merchant Bank (UMB). The prosecution alleges that the monies were unlawfully obtained under the guise of procuring a cyber-defence system.
However, a closer examination of the evidence placed before the court raises important questions about whether the prosecution has been able to establish that the funds were public money, that the transactions were unauthorised, that the documents presented to the bank were not genuine, or that the accused persons caused a quantifiable financial loss to the State.
The central difficulty for the prosecution is that several of the facts it relies on appear to be accompanied by significant evidential gaps and inconsistencies.
For instance, the Prosecution’s case identifies the Fidelity Bank account as a regular public account, yet its own witnesses identify the account as one associated with the National Security Coordinator’s special operations. The Prosecution’s own evidence also raises questions about whether the account was established to receive government funds and whether the GH¢49.1 million was ever part of an approved government allocation or budgetary release.
The evidence shows that the said account was not a public account and never received state funds or any funds from a public source. The account only received funds from private sources, including deposits from Adu-Boahene himself and other persons. The Prosecution’s evidence suggests that no audit report identifies a missing GH¢49.1 million, and the National Security Service has raised no complaint or complaint regarding the same.
The Prosecution’s own evidence further indicates that GH¢9.537 million was paid to ISC Holdings of Israel, GH¢7.2 million was transferred to the coordinator’s account, GH¢2.347 million was paid back to the Coordinator’s account, while GH¢16 million was placed on deposit. These transactions raise a fundamental question: how was the alleged financial loss calculated, and what precisely did the State lose?
The evidence surrounding the three cheques also presents questions about authority and participation. The bank mandate identified the National Security Coordinator and other named officials as signatories. The cheques were jointly signed in accordance with the bank mandate.
The prosecution must therefore establish more than the fact that the money moved; it must demonstrate that the movement was unauthorised and constituted a criminal act. The prosecution’s own witnesses have testified that the National Security Coordinator himself authorized and approved all three cheques totaling GH¢49 1 million.
Questions also remain about the alleged forged contract and invoice. The evidence reportedly shows that ISC Holdings received US$1.75 million and that the payment milestones corresponded with invoices. The investigator had not independently verified the alleged invoice irregularity with ISC Holdings. The prosecution must still establish the alleged forgery and connect it to the criminal conduct charged.
The allegations against the second accused also raise a question of individual responsibility. Evidence of shareholding, directorship or association with a company is not, without more, proof of knowledge of or participation in an alleged criminal transaction.
The prosecution’s evidence, as presented, has not identified her as a signatory to the three disputed cheques or demonstrated the specific act by which she allegedly participated in the transaction.
On the money-laundering counts, the prosecution must establish that the funds constituted proceeds of unlawful activity and that the accused had the requisite knowledge or suspicion. Evidence that transfers occurred or that an accused person had access to an account does not, by itself, establish that the money was criminal proceeds.
The timing of the charges also raises a legal question. The prosecution relies on the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044), which came into force on 29 December 2020, while the particulars refer to conduct in 2020. The applicable law and the dates of the alleged conduct therefore matter in determining those counts.
The following table summarises the principal allegations and the evidential questions arising from the prosecution’s own case.
THE PROSECUTION’S CASE: WHAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWS — AND WHAT REMAINS UNANSWERED
| PROSECUTION’S ALLEGATION / ISSUE | EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT AND QUESTIONS IT RAISES |
| A. THE BUREAU, FIDELITY ACCOUNT AND THE MONEY | |
| 1. The BNC was a state agency. | The evidence describes the BNC as a department operating under the National Security Coordinator. The question is whether this description, without more, establishes the legal and financial status of the disputed account. No state agency is called the BNC. |
| 2. The Fidelity account belonged to the BNC. | Exhibit 35 identifies the account as the National Security Coordinator’s account, opened in the coordinator’s name in 2017. The account’s description and ownership are therefore material to the prosecution’s case. The account is not a public account opened in the manner in which all other state accounts are opened in accordance with the PFM Act, 2016 |
| 3. The money in the account belonged to the State. | The evidence raises questions about whether the account was established to receive government funds and whether the money in it was held on behalf of the State. No evidence on record shows that the account ever received state funds. The account was also not set up to receive state funds. |
| 4. The GH¢49.1 million was public money. | The prosecution’s own evidence raises questions about whether the amount formed part of the BNC’s budget, was released through GIFMIS, or was traceable to an identified government allocation. Their own second prosecution witness testified that in the material year of 2020, the entire BNC department budget was GH¢ 13.1 million; therefore, it was impossible for GH¢ 49.1 million to have been stolen. The witnesses testified that they did not know the source or purpose of the funds. |
| 5. The accused had no lawful entitlement to the funds. | The evidence must establish the character and ownership of the funds before criminal liability can properly arise. The mere presence or movement of money in an account does not resolve that question. The monies traced into the source account include monies paid in by Kwabena Adu Boahene and sourced by Advantage Solutions. Therefore, there are reasonable grounds to believe the money they are accused of stealing is their own. |
| B. SIGNATORIES AND AUTHORITY FOR THE THREE CHEQUES | |
| 6. The first accused controlled the account and the transactions. | The bank mandate identified the relevant joint signatories, including the National Security Coordinator. The mandate required joint signatures; the transactions cannot be assessed by isolating one signatory’s role. The prosecution’s own evidence shows that the National Security Coordinator was Adu-Boahene’s superior, controlled the office’s finances, and authorized the movement of the monies. Adu-Boahene alone could not issue cheques or move money. |
| 7. The first accused independently instructed the drawing and deposit of the cheques. | The cheques were jointly signed under the bank mandate. The prosecution could not establish the specific unauthorised instruction or conduct attributed to the first accused. |
| 8. The transfer from Fidelity Bank to UMB was unauthorised. | The evidence refers to an explanation that the funds were transferred under the account owner’s own signature, to UMB for a better exchange rate. The investigator did not obtain a request memorandum or authorisation document from the relevant office. |
| 9. The National Security Coordinator would have been investigated if alive. | The investigator reportedly acknowledged that the coordinator would have been investigated and possibly charged had he been alive. This raises questions about the role of the other signatory to the transactions. This clearly means that the prosecution’s own theory is incomplete. The prosecution also failed to interview the current and immediate past National Security Coordinator. The prosecutors also did not interview the immediate past and current ministers responsible for national security. |
| C. THE CHEQUES AND THE RECEIVING ACCOUNT | |
| 10. The three cheques were diverted from their intended destination. | The bank referred to the UMB account as “BNC Operations”. The prosecution must establish the alleged diversion and identify the account into which the money ought lawfully to have been paid. The evidence shows that the prosecution could not show any alternative account into which the money should have been paid. The only account answering to the payee’s name was the exact account the cheques were paid into. |
| 11. The UMB account was opened to conceal the identity of the BNC. | BNC Communications Bureau Limited existed before the account was opened in February 2020 and had an existing banking relationship with UMB. The circumstances surrounding the account’s opening and its operational purpose were not proved to be criminal. However, the prosecution’s own second witness testified that the UMB account was a national security front special operations account she did not have clearance to know. |
| D. THE CONTRACT, INVOICE AND ALLEGATION OF FORGERY | |
| 13. The first accused presented a forged sale contract to UMB. | The prosecution’s evidence includes the contract and invoices relating to ISC Holdings. The investigator accepted that the payment milestones corresponded with invoices and that ISC Holdings received all monies corresponding to the SWIFT transfers in evidence, including the US$1.75 million. The investigator did not independently establish the alleged forgery. |
| 14. Invoice NSC 006 was fake or forged. | The finance witness described the invoice as possibly containing an error. The investigator had not verified the alleged irregularity with ISC Holdings. |
| 15. The NSB had no contract with ISC Holdings for a cyber-defence system. | The evidence refers to payments to ISC Holdings between October 2020 and June 2022 against procurement milestones. The existence, approval and purpose of the relevant procurement arrangements remain important. The second prosecution witness also admitted that she personally processed the monies to ISC Holdings. |
| E. WHERE THE MONEY WENT | |
| 18. The entire GH¢49.1 million was spent on the accused, their associates and families. | The prosecution’s own figures include payments to ISC Holdings and other suppliers, transfers back to the coordinator’s account, fixed deposits on the account itself and withdrawals by National Security operatives for special operations. The movement of the funds must be distinguished from proof that the amount was unlawfully appropriated. |
| 20. The UMB account had no other source of funds apart from the GH¢49.1 million. | Exhibit U reportedly records total credits of GH¢179.46 million, including GH¢27.94 million deposited between August and November 2020. The account’s full transaction history is therefore material to the prosecution’s claim. The prosecution’s own evidence does not support this claim. |
| 21. The accused used the alleged proceeds to acquire private properties, luxury vehicles, a fertilizer business, and to live a lavish lifestyle | The investigator reportedly acknowledged that no part of the disputed GH¢49.1 million was linked to the alleged properties, vehicles, fertilizer business or purported lavish lifestyle. No Titles, deeds, or any such documents were presented to show ownership of the properties by the accused persons, and the real owners of Kobby Keach K. Hotel have sued EOCO for the wrongful attachment of their property. |
| F. THE THIRD ACCUSED, SECOND ACCUSED AND CONTROL | |
| 23. Advantage Solutions was owned, managed or controlled by the first and second accused. | The investigator’s evidence identified the second accused as the sole shareholder and beneficial owner. The investigator’s evidence did not identify the first accused as a director or shareholder. The prosecution must establish the specific participation alleged against each accused. Adu-Boahene is not a director or shareholder of the company. The company was also incorporated in 2008. |
| G. PUBLIC OFFICE, BANK TRANSACTION AND ALLEGED LOSS | |
| 24. The first accused abused his office as NSB Director-General to obtain UMB clearance for the US$1.75 million transfer. | The NSB was established on 29 December 2020, while the transaction in question occurred in February 2020. The prosecution must establish the office held by the accused at the material time and the specific abuse alleged. The prosecution’s own evidence of A1’s payslip shows that he was a Principal Analyst at the National Security Council Secretariat, and not a Director General of the NSB. |
| 25. The evidence of the third prosecution witness independently establishes the disputed transactions. | The witness’s spreadsheets and handwritten records did not reconcile correctly with the bank statements. The witness reportedly acknowledged making entries based on questions put to her by her lawyer. The reliability and evidential weight of those records are therefore important. She testified under examination-in-chief that the handwritten documents which she converted into an Excel sheet were recorded at the material time in 2020. Meanwhile, it was shown under cross-examination that the document was created in May 2026, per the document’s history. PW3’s testimony was totally discredited. |
THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT
The issue is not simply whether money moved from one bank account to another. It is whether the prosecution has established, through admissible evidence, that the money was public property, that the transactions were unauthorised, that the alleged documents were forged, that the accused acted with the requisite criminal intent and that the State suffered the alleged financial loss.
The prosecution must prove the essential elements of each charge. Suspicion, association, account access and the existence of financial transactions cannot, on their own, substitute for proof of the alleged offences.
The accused persons have not yet opened their defence. The issues highlighted above arise from the prosecution’s evidence and the submissions now before the court. They are not findings of guilt or innocence.
Ultimately, the court must determine whether the prosecution has established a case sufficiently compelling to require the accused persons to answer the charges.
