By late June 2025, when the Minerals Income Investment Fund’s 2024 audited financial statements were finally signed and endorsed, Ghana’s public narrative was already fixed in a place far from the facts.
In the absence of timely communication, provisional internal documents, incomplete explanations, and misinterpreted signals had shaped a national climate of suspicion.
The audited truth entered a conversation already shaped by fear, fueled by speculation, and strengthened by silence. The numbers told a story of strength, yet expectations had been set for collapse.
In institutional governance, the lesson is constant: when fact delays its entrance, rumour takes the main stage and refuses to step aside.
This long read examines what the financials actually revealed, why they contradicted the earlier narrative, and why their delayed release allowed shadows to grow larger than the reality behind them.
- What the audited financials actually revealed
On 26 June 2025, MIIF’s CEO and Board Chair signed the audited financial statements for 2024. On 27 June, the Ghana Audit Service endorsed them. The documents painted a strikingly different picture from what had dominated the national conversation.
1.1 A strong financial position
The audit confirmed:
- Income exceeding GHS 1.9 billion
- Cash and cash equivalents above GHS 5.6 billion
- Total assets of more than GHS 11.2 billion
Few public institutions, outside the central bank and pension funds, record such cash holdings relative to mandate maturity.
These numbers reflected institutional resilience rather than the turmoil suggested earlier. As governance wisdom teaches, a tree with deep roots is rarely uprooted by the wind’s noise.
1.2 Administrative expenditure was globally competitive
Administrative spending at approximately three per cent of income was well within, and in some cases below, global standards for sovereign funds.
Comparative benchmarks include:
- Norway: four to five per cent
- Singapore: three to five per cent
- Botswana: four per cent
- Abu Dhabi: three to six per cent
MIIF’s cost structure was conservative rather than excessive.
1.3 No evidence of catastrophic losses
Despite public claims of enormous losses, the audit did not confirm such outcomes. Items presented earlier as losses were instead:
- valuation adjustments
- unrealised exposures
- temporary risk positions
The audit contradicted the narrative of $100 million in losses. But the correction arrived too late to shift the public mood.
- Why the audited truth arrived too late
2.1 Silence created a vacuum
For institutions under scrutiny, silence is not neutral. It is an accelerant. In the space where verified truth should have stood, interpretations multiplied.
2.2 The management observation letter was misunderstood
The Management Observation Letter (MOL) is a routine audit tool designed to highlight procedural gaps and request improvement. It is not:
- an accusation
- a conclusion
- an indictment
- a declaration of loss
- a corruption finding
Yet the MOL became the centre of internal anxiety and later a national headline when it surfaced prematurely.
A reminder applies: a question is not a verdict, but it becomes one when taken out of its rightful place.
2.3 Limited engagement between old and new leadership
The new CEO, appointed in January, did not fully engage with the previous CEO or the board to understand prior decisions. Without context, internal interpretations became vulnerable to distortion.
2.4 Conflicting reporting channels created confusion
Inside MIIF, self-serving internal agendas and parallel reporting structures created inconsistencies that shaped parliamentary briefings. Parliament debated information that had not been reconciled with the audited facts. By the time truth arrived, perception had already been cemented.
Before the institution realised it had lost control of its narrative, the narrative had already left the building.
- Why the audited financials were not released immediately
Although the current leadership had approved the financials, hesitation followed. The reasons may include:
3.1 The audit contradicted the earlier narrative
Publishing strong results after weeks of crisis commentary presented a credibility dilemma.
3.2 Reputational sensitivity
A sudden shift from “potential losses” to “institutional stability” risked raising questions about earlier communications.
3.3 Fear of public backlash
Leadership may have feared the optics of releasing strong results after weeks of public anxiety.
Whatever the motive, the delay allowed speculation to harden into public belief.
As the proverb teaches, when truth walks slowly, doubt rides the fastest horse.
- Administrative spending, board fees and foreign travel: what the numbers really show
Public debate intensified around MIIF’s spending. A closer look reveals that the numbers were not only defensible but also aligned with international practice.
4.1 Administrative spending was reasonable
At three per cent of income, MIIF’s administrative costs were lean by global sovereign fund standards.
4.2 Board fees were modest
GHS 2 million in board fees represented 0.1 percent of income.
Comparative benchmarks include:
- Norway’s sovereign fund spends up to 0.5 percent on board and oversight
- Khazanah Malaysia spends over 0.4 percent
- CPPIB Canada spends more than twelve million dollars annually
MIIF was operating well below these thresholds.
4.3 Foreign travel and due diligence: Context matters
GHS 11 million in foreign travel and due diligence was equal to 0.6 percent of income, significantly below the two to five percent expended by global peers.
Key context:
- Mining investments require direct site verification
- Partnerships in Toronto, London, Johannesburg, Dubai and Singapore cannot be managed remotely
- Capacity building is essential for a new sovereign minerals fund
In Canada, Norway, Abu Dhabi and Singapore, international engagement is a core operational function, not a luxury.
As the elders say, you cannot inspect a gold mine through a window and expect to understand its worth.
4.4 Why these numbers became misunderstood
Three failures contributed:
- Late publication of audited facts
- Absence of contextual explanation
- A public narrative shaped prematurely by incomplete information
This is how routine expenditure became misinterpreted as excess.
- The Goldridge issue: A number that ran faster than the facts
The most sensational narrative was the supposed GHS 708.7 million loss linked to Goldridge. Yet the audited financials did not classify this as a loss.
5.1 The exposure was detected internally
The previous executive team identified the exposure and informed the board.
This reflects strong governance, not scandal.
5.2 The board suspended the programme
Suspension is a standard risk control measure used by sovereign funds globally. It is not an admission of failure.
5.3 It was Not a realised loss
The audit did not classify Goldridge as:
- a loss
- an impairment
- a written off asset
The initial figure was provisional, awaiting clarification.
5.4 How it became a national narrative
Because audited financials were not released promptly:
- Parliament debated preliminary exposure figures
- The media reported exposure as loss
- Public sentiment hardened
- The audit could not reverse the emotional narrative
As governance wisdom notes, a rumour that travels far becomes more believable than a fact that arrives late.
Conclusion: Lessons for future governance
Goldridge is not a story of hundreds of millions lost. It is a story of communication delays, misinterpreted drafts, internal fragmentation, and public expectations overtaking evidence.
The lessons are clear:
- A Management Observation Letter must never again be treated as an audit report
- New executives must engage predecessors before drawing conclusions
- Exposures must not be mistaken for losses
- Timely publication of audits is essential for public confidence
- Institutions must speak early, clearly and accurately
This crisis was preventable.
Part Three will examine how narrative drift influenced Parliament, how amendments to the MIIF Act became inevitable, and what Ghana must reform to prevent future institutional turbulence.
P,Y. Atta
