Proposed amendments to the Bank of Ghana (BoG) Act, 2025, have triggered renewed debate over the legal and institutional independence of the country’s central bank, with concerns centering on governance structure, board tenure, and potential executive influence.
At the heart of the controversy is Clause 18 of the proposed amendment, which seeks to extend the tenure of the Bank of Ghana’s Board of Directors from four years to five years. Critics argue that the proposal is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 2019 ruling in Theophilus Donkor v. Attorney General, which held that such boards’ tenure is coterminous with the president’s tenure.
That decision has neither been reviewed nor overturned, raising questions about the constitutionality of legislating a longer term; therefore, the proposal before parliament, sponsored by the Executive Branch, is problematic and likely to be subject to a constitutional injunction should such a matter come before the Supreme Court.
Beyond board tenure, the proposed amendments have also reignited fears of encroachment on the central bank’s operational autonomy, particularly proposals that could place the Bank of Ghana under the supervisory authority of the Minister for Finance.
Such an arrangement has been described as problematic and plain regulatory capture, with reference to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Act of 2007, which placed the CBN under the supervision of Nigeria’s Minister of Finance.
That structure has historically generated tension between the executive and the central bank. It has been criticised by stakeholders in the banking industry, international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other development partners.
Globally, such frameworks are often cited as examples of poor central bank governance and regulatory capture, where political authorities exert influence over technical and monetary policy decisions. Analysts warn that similar proposals in Ghana could erode the Bank of Ghana’s independence and expose it to executive interference.
Concerns have also been raised about potential conflicts of interest, given the government’s controlling stakes in several commercial banks and financial institutions regulated by the Bank of Ghana.
These include GCB Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank, the National Investment Bank, and other non-banking financial institutions. Subjecting the central bank to ministerial supervision under such circumstances is viewed as a direct regulatory conflict and an unprecedented consolidation of executive control over monetary policy decisions and banking regulation.
International best practices in central bank governance point to legislative rather than executive oversight. In the United Kingdom, the Bank of England reports to the House of Commons Treasury Committee rather than to the Treasury Secretary.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve reports to Congress rather than the Treasury Secretary. Similarly, the Bank of Canada is accountable to the Canadian Parliament and not an executive appointee.
These models are widely regarded as safeguards that preserve central bank independence while ensuring democratic accountability.
The idea that the government is using a “bully pulpit” strategy to gain public sympathy through surrogates to push the Bank of Ghana under executive oversight is dangerous and constitutes pure regulatory capture.
Finally, government must bring innovative legislation on the appointment of the central Bank’s governors before parliament for scrutiny, vetting, and confirmation, if we are interested in the Bank of Ghana’s governance, independence and accountability going forward.
Their compensation, conditions of service, and terms of engagement should be made public at least before parliament.
Patrick Nyarko
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