Africa Policy Lens (APL) has blamed what it describes as “avoidable management lapses” at the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) for the government’s decision to slash cocoa producer prices by 28.6%.
In a strongly worded press statement titled “Who Failed the Farmer? The Policy Missteps Behind Ghana’s 28.6% Farmer Haircut,” APL argues that the price reduction is not merely the result of falling global prices but reflects deeper structural and managerial failures within the cocoa sector.
On February 12, 2026, the government reduced the guaranteed farmgate price from GH₵58,000 per tonne (GH₵3,625 per 64kg bag) to GH₵41,392 (GH₵2,587 per bag).
Describing the move as a shock to farmers, APL said the decision “will sharply reduce cocoa incomes for about 800,000 smallholders and deepen rural poverty.”
The group noted that the policy shift “was not foreshadowed in the 2025 budget, raising concerns about fairness and transparency.”
Cocoa remains the primary source of income for approximately 800,000 households. APL estimates that the 28.6% cut could affect roughly 3.2 million rural residents when household sizes are factored in.
“In practical terms, a farmer expecting to sell 10 tonnes would now earn about GH₵170,000 instead of GH₵240,000, representing a revenue reduction of roughly GH₵70,000,” the statement explained, warning of likely impacts on education, health spending, and food security.
APL criticised COCOBOD’s handling of the 2025/26 crop season, pointing to what it called a failure to adjust pricing strategy in line with global market signals.
According to the group, COCOBOD set an initial farmgate price of GH₵51,660 per tonne in August 2025, based on a projected international price of $7,200 per tonne.
Rather than revising the price downward as international futures declined, management increased the cedi price in October 2025 to GH₵58,000, citing exchange-rate adjustments and concerns over smuggling after Côte d’Ivoire announced a premium price.
“This lock-in only postponed reckoning with market realities,” APL said, adding that by February 2026, global prices had plunged to around $3,680 per tonne.
The group accused authorities of transferring the full burden of the market correction onto farmers.
“In effect, the Government temporarily absorbed the cost of maintaining a higher producer price in order to deter smuggling, but subsequently transferred the full burden of market correction onto farmers,” it stated.
APL further faulted COCOBOD’s forward sales programme, arguing that management “did not lock in adequate volumes at high prices earlier in 2025.”
“The result was a liquidity shortfall: with most beans unsold into the downturn, the Board had no reserved revenue to support farmers,” the statement said.
It described the situation as “a failure to read market signals and execute a dynamic sales strategy.”
The group also linked recent market declines to public comments by COCOBOD CEO, Dr. Randy Abbey.
APL said it notes “with grave concern the high correlation between the public disclosures made by COCOBOD CEO, Dr. Randy Abbey, on 6 February 2026, and the subsequent catastrophic collapse of the Free-On-Board (FOB) price.”
According to the statement, on the day of Dr. Abbey’s disclosure, about 50,000 metric tonnes of unsold, “overpriced” cocoa, the International Cocoa Organization daily price stood at $4,214.95 per tonne.
“By 13 February 2026, the price plummeted to US$3,681.10 per tonne – a staggering 12.67% value erosion in a single week,” APL said.
The group argued that “signalling such significant uncontracted volumes without a pre-established hedge or a robust Stabilization Fund floor directly invited the predatory short-selling that has now cost the Ghanaian farmer GH¢1,038 per bag in expected income.”
APL contrasted Ghana’s approach with that of neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, stating that while both countries announced record producer prices during the global price surge, Côte d’Ivoire cushioned farmers when prices dipped.
“By contrast, Ghana’s institutions absorbed none of it – Ghanaian farmers alone bore the downward shock,” the statement asserted.
Risk of Rising Galamsey, Youth Exit
The policy think tank warned that the price cut could exacerbate illegal mining, commonly known as galamsey, as cocoa farming and small-scale mining compete for labour and land.
“Lower farmgate income reduces liquidity for farm maintenance, replanting, and hired labour, which can accelerate farm abandonment or shifts into mining activities,” it said.
The group also cautioned that the sharp reduction risks discouraging youth participation in cocoa farming, potentially undermining intergenerational continuity in the sector.
APL described the crisis as “structural and managerial.”
“The 28.6% farmgate price cut is not merely the consequence of global cocoa price volatility; it is the culmination of avoidable management lapses within the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD),” it stated.
Among its recommendations are the establishment of an independent commodity risk committee within COCOBOD, the creation of a statutory price stabilization fund, mandatory forward sales transparency, the removal of discretionary exchange rate adjustments from pricing calculations, and strengthened parliamentary oversight.
“Farmers – who neither determine forward contracts nor control currency assumptions – are now bearing the financial consequences of decisions taken at the managerial level,” APL stressed.
