Every June, Ghana receives one of the most important documents produced by any public institution: the Auditor-General’s Report. It is perhaps the most comprehensive annual assessment of how faithfully public officials have managed the resources entrusted to them by taxpayers.
Yet, despite its constitutional importance, the report has become part of a familiar national ritual. The Auditor-General identifies billions of cedis in financial irregularities. Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee convenes public hearings. Ministries promise reforms.
Citizens express outrage. Media headlines dominate public discussion for a few days. Then the nation quietly moves on until the next report reveals even larger losses.
The 2025 Report of the Auditor-General on the Public Accounts of Ghana: Ministries, Departments and Other Agencies (MDAs) should not be viewed merely as another annual audit. It should be recognised as compelling evidence that Ghana’s public financial management system is failing to learn from its own mistakes.
The figures are not simply larger than previous years; they expose recurring weaknesses in revenue administration, financial controls, payroll management, procurement, contract administration and institutional accountability.
This pattern is deeply troubling because Ghana is not short of laws. The country has a modern Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921), a Public Procurement Act, constitutional safeguards under Article 187, an independent Auditor-General and an active Public Accounts Committee of Parliament.
Yet the same categories of irregularities appear year after year. The issue is therefore no longer whether Ghana has the legal framework to protect public resources. The issue is whether there is sufficient political and administrative commitment to enforce it.
A Record Level of Financial Irregularities
The Auditor-General’s report presents a stark picture. According to Table 1A (page 8) of the report, total financial irregularities recorded across Ministries, Departments and Agencies amounted to GH¢5,266,315,079 for the financial year ended 31 December 2025. This represents the highest level of irregularities reported for MDAs in recent years.
The report categorises these irregularities as follows:
* Tax irregularities: GH¢4,801,918,422
* Cash irregularities: GH¢410,699,645
* Debts, loans and advances: GH¢29,251,842
* Payroll irregularities: GH¢19,924,710
* Contract irregularities: GH¢3,349,828
* Stores irregularities: GH¢1,125,692
* Rent irregularities: GH¢44,940
The Auditor-General classifies these amounts as recoverable and recommends that accounting officers take immediate action to recover losses, strengthen controls and sanction officers whose negligence contributed to these breaches. (Table 1A, page 8).
Perhaps the most alarming feature is not merely the total amount but the dominance of tax irregularities. More than 91 per cent of all recorded financial irregularities relate to failures in tax administration. In any economy, taxes are the principal means by which governments finance hospitals, schools, roads, security, water infrastructure and social protection. When weaknesses in tax administration account for almost the entire value of audit findings, the implications extend well beyond accounting failures; they undermine the state’s capacity to deliver essential public services.
The Trend is Moving in the Wrong Direction
One report, viewed in isolation, may be dismissed as an unfortunate exception. The five-year trend tells a different story.
According to Table 1B (page 8) of the 2025 report, total financial irregularities recorded in MDAs have evolved as follows:
Financial Year Total Irregularities
2021 GH¢1.081 billion
2022 GH¢1.412 billion
2023 GH¢2.407 billion
2024 GH¢2.055 billion
2025 GH¢5.266 billion
Although there was a modest decline in 2024, the increase recorded in 2025 more than erased any previous improvement. The figure is approximately two and a half times higher than the previous year and nearly five times higher than the level recorded in 2021.
This trend raises an uncomfortable question. If audit recommendations are implemented each year, why are the same categories of irregularities growing instead of declining?
The answer lies in the distinction between reporting and accountability.
Ghana has become increasingly proficient at documenting financial failures. It has been far less effective at preventing them.
Where Are the Biggest Risks?
The ministry-by-ministry analysis contained in Table 2 (page 14) illustrates that financial exposure is not evenly distributed across government.
The Ministry of Finance accounted for approximately GH¢4.81 billion of the irregularities reported, representing the overwhelming majority of the national total. The Ministry of Energy followed with approximately GH¢379 million, while the Ministries of Works and Housing and Health also recorded significant irregularities.
This concentration suggests that strengthening controls within a relatively small number of high-risk institutions could substantially reduce national financial exposure.
Rather than applying limited audit resources uniformly across all public institutions, Ghana should adopt a risk-based oversight model similar to those used by the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office and other Supreme Audit Institutions. High-risk entities should receive continuous monitoring, more frequent internal audits and enhanced oversight from their governing boards.
Financial Irregularities Are Not Always Theft—but They Are Always Costly
Public discussion often assumes that every audit irregularity represents stolen money. That is not necessarily correct.
An audit irregularity is a transaction that breaches financial rules, lacks adequate supporting documentation, reflects poor internal controls or exposes public funds to unnecessary risk. Some losses are recoverable. Others result from administrative negligence rather than deliberate fraud.
Nevertheless, the economic effect is the same.
Every cedi tied up in unsupported payments, uncollected tax revenue, unrecovered advances or poorly managed contracts is a cedi unavailable for investment in education, healthcare, policing, roads or economic development.
Audit failures therefore impose an opportunity cost on every Ghanaian citizen.
The recurring nature of these findings suggests that many institutions have normalised weak financial management. What begins as a procedural lapse gradually evolves into an accepted administrative culture.
That culture must change.
PART II
The Real Problem Is Not Weak Laws—It Is Weak Enforcement
One of the greatest misconceptions surrounding Ghana’s public financial management is that the country suffers from inadequate legislation. It does not.
Ghana possesses one of the most comprehensive legal and institutional frameworks for public financial management in Africa. Article 187 of the 1992 Constitution establishes the Office of the Auditor-General as an independent constitutional body mandated to audit the public accounts of Ghana. The Public Financial Management Act, 2016 (Act 921), clearly prescribes how public funds should be received, managed and accounted for. The Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), as amended, regulates public procurement and seeks to ensure value for money, fairness and transparency. Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) exists to examine audit findings and hold accounting officers to account.
On paper, Ghana’s governance architecture compares favourably with many middle-income countries.
Yet the 2025 Auditor-General’s Report demonstrates that legal compliance has not translated into behavioural change. Instead, the same categories of irregularities recur with remarkable consistency. The problem is therefore institutional rather than legislative.
The International Monetary Fund has repeatedly observed that countries rarely improve public financial management simply by enacting new laws. Sustainable improvement occurs only when compliance becomes part of institutional culture and when violations attract predictable sanctions. Likewise, the World Bank’s Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework emphasises that effective public financial management depends not merely on legal rules but on strong internal controls, timely reporting, external scrutiny and corrective action.
Ghana performs reasonably well in producing audits. It performs far less effectively in acting upon them.
Why the Same Findings Reappear Every Year
The Auditor-General’s reports over the past five years reveal an unmistakable pattern. Ministries and agencies repeatedly fail to recover advances, reconcile bank accounts, collect taxes, manage contracts properly, account for stores and maintain complete supporting documentation. The language changes slightly from year to year, but the weaknesses remain substantially the same.
This repetition suggests that many audit recommendations are treated as administrative observations rather than mandatory corrective directives.
In countries with mature public accountability systems, audit findings trigger immediate institutional responses. In Ghana, they often trigger explanations.
The distinction is important.
An explanation may satisfy a parliamentary committee. It does not recover lost public funds.
Nor does it deter future misconduct.
The United Kingdom: Audit Followed by Immediate Accountability
The United Kingdom offers an instructive example.
The National Audit Office (NAO) audits all central government departments and reports directly to Parliament rather than the Executive. More importantly, audit findings are systematically followed by investigations conducted by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee.
Departments receiving adverse findings must produce formal Treasury Minutes explaining precisely how recommendations will be implemented. Progress is monitored and departments may be recalled before Parliament where implementation is inadequate.
Equally significant is HM Treasury’s guidance contained in Managing Public Money, which imposes personal responsibilities on Accounting Officers. Permanent Secretaries are individually responsible for ensuring regularity, propriety, value for money and feasibility in public expenditure.
This personal accountability changes organisational behaviour.
Officials understand that financial failures are not anonymous institutional mistakes; they become matters of individual professional responsibility.
Ghana should adopt a similar Accounting Officer accountability framework requiring Chief Directors and Heads of Agencies to certify annually that adequate internal financial controls are operating within their institutions.
Sources: HM Treasury, Managing Public Money (2023); UK National Audit Office; UK House of Commons Public Accounts Committee.
Singapore: Zero Tolerance and Preventive Governance
Singapore consistently ranks among the least corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index.
Its success is not accidental.
The Auditor-General’s Office works alongside robust internal audit units, while the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) investigates corruption independently of political influence.
More importantly, Singapore focuses on preventing financial irregularities before they occur.
Government payments are highly digitised. Procurement is conducted electronically. Internal controls operate continuously rather than annually. Officers receive regular ethics and financial management training. Audit recommendations are implemented promptly.
By Bennard Nana Owusu
