There was a time in Ghana when the idea of tomato scarcity in March would have sounded almost absurd. For those of us who grew up in the Kassena-Nankana areas in the 1980s and 1990s, tomatoes were not just a crop. They were an economy, a culture, and in many ways, a future for the youth.
I do not speak from hearsay. I was part of that system. I farmed. I dug wells with my own hands. I drew water with buckets and ropes to water my tomato beds. I watched seasons rise with promise and fall with loss.
Today, those same lands tell a different story. And if we are honest with ourselves, this is not an accident. It is a policy failure.
The Golden Era of Dry-Season Farming
In the Upper East Region, particularly within Kassena-Nankana communities such as Doba, Kandiga, Mirigu, Manyoro, Nayagegnia, Nyangua, Navio, Nakolo, and Pungu (not exhaustive), dry season farming was once the backbone of local livelihoods.
Tomatoes dominated production. Pepper, garden eggs, okro, onions, and watermelon complemented the system, but tomatoes were king.
Farmers began planting as early as October to secure early harvests, which sold higher between December and February. A second cycle, planted between December and January, extended the harvest season into April and May.
This was not subsistence farming. It was organized, predictable, and commercially viable. As the Akan proverb goes, “Se wo werɛ fi na wosankɔfa a, yenkyi”, it is not wrong to go back for what you have forgotten. Ghana must remember this system.
A Thriving Market System Driven by Women Traders
At the heart of this agricultural success was a vibrant market network led largely by women traders (Tomatoe Queens), particularly from southern Ghana. These traders travelled long distances, settled temporarily in towns like Navrongo and Bolga, and moved across farming communities to purchase tomatoes directly from producers.
Mini-markets sprang up organically. Food vendors, water sellers, transport operators, and traders of clothing and footwear all benefited. The local economy pulsed with life.
The Tono and Vea irrigation dams were central to this ecosystem, supporting tomato production in the dry season and rice cultivation during the rains.
It was, in many respects, a self-sustaining rural economy with little or no government support; rather, the district assemblies collected taxes from these farmers once they sold their produce there.
The Unfortunate Turning Point: When the Market Walked Away
Then, slowly but decisively, things began to change. The same traders who once sustained the local economy began to bypass Ghanaian farmers, crossing into neighboring Burkina Faso to source tomatoes in full view of security forces at Navrongo and the Paga Border.
Their reasoning was simple: Burkina Faso’s tomatoes were firmer, more resilient, and less prone to post-harvest losses.
Ghana’s tomatoes, by contrast, they said, were softer and perished quickly.
What seemed like a minor preference shift became a structural rupture. This shift is what became known as the “Wagyea Tomato Business,” spanning from the late 90s to today.
Many accidents kill many Ghanaians, caused by Kia Drivers who carry tomatoes from Burkina. It became a ritual that many would die during every ‘Wagyea’ season through uncontrollable accidents. Some attributed it to witchcraft, juju, while the elite called it reckless driving and carelessness. Oh many a life we lost!
Farmers in Kassena-Nankana began to record significant losses. Harvests rotted without buyers. Investments turned into debts. Confidence eroded.
And eventually, many farmers walked away. As another proverb reminds us, “The ruin of a nation begins in the homes of its people.” In this case, it began on its farms.
Burkina Faso’s Strategic Shift vs. Ghana’s Policy Silence
While Ghana’s farmers struggled, Burkina Faso made a strategic decision: invest in value addition.
Tomato processing factories were established to absorb excess production and stabilize the market. The goal was clear: feed local industry, reduce waste, and create jobs.
Ghana, on the other hand, watched helplessly- no policy, no action, and no results. Thanks to Captain Ibrahim Traore for the action that they say speaks louder than words.
Projects such as the Pwalugu Tomato Factory and other agro-processing initiatives remain either stalled, abandoned, or underperforming. Critical infrastructure such as the Tono and Vea dams, once symbols of productivity, is now underutilized.
This contrast is not merely economic. It is political. It reflects a difference in policy intent and execution.
The Politics of Convenience and Missed Responsibility
Over the years, the response to this decline has been shaped more by political rhetoric than strategic action. Both the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have, at different times, reduced the issue to partisan debate to seek populist importance rather than national priority.
When traders began sourcing from Burkina Faso, the prevailing argument centered on market freedom and cross-border trade rights. While economically valid, this perspective ignored the long-term consequences for domestic production. I am sure if that was the thinking of the Burkinabe government, their current action would never have come to play.
More recently, even security-related incidents involving tomato traders in Burkina Faso who were involved in terrorist attacks have been politicized, with blame-shifting overshadowing problem-solving.
Meanwhile, farmers continue to bear the cost
As we say locally, “When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.” In this case, the grass is the Ghanaian farmer, not the NPP or NDC.
From Farms to Pits: The Rise of Galamsey
The collapse of the tomato economy in the Upper East Region has had unintended consequences on the Ghanaian farmer and especially the youth.
With farming no longer viable, many young people have migrated into illegal mining, known locally as galamsey.
This shift is not simply about income. It reflects a failure of an opportunity.
Where there were once farms, there are now pits. Where there was once food production, there is now environmental degradation and, too often, loss of life.
This is not just an agricultural issue. It is a national development crisis.
The Unasked Questions
Several critical questions remain unanswered:
•Why did Ghana fail to study and adapt Burkina Faso’s more resilient tomato varieties?
•Why was there no sustained investment in post-harvest technology and storage?
•Why were irrigation schemes not modernized to support year-round production?
•Why have processing factories remained dormant while imports continue to rise?
These are not technical questions. They are governance questions.
A Path Forward: Policy, Not Promises
Ghana has the capacity to revive its tomato industry. What it lacks is a deliberate, coordinated policy action.
The following steps are urgent:
1.Revamp and operationalize tomato processing factories
Facilities like the Pwalugu Tomato Factory must be completed and run efficiently to guarantee a ready market for farmers.
2.Invest in research and seed development
Ghana must develop or adopt tomato varieties that are firm, durable, and suited for long-distance transport.
3.Strengthen irrigation infrastructure
Modernizing systems around Tono and Vea dams will ensure consistent production.
4.Establish guaranteed pricing and market systems
As with cocoa, a structured pricing regime can stabilize farmers’ incomes.
5.Enhance post-harvest handling and storage
Reducing losses is as important as increasing production.
Conclusion: A Nation at the Crossroads
There is a quiet truth many of us are reluctant to admit. We once had it right.
We had the land, the knowledge, the labour, and the market. What we lacked was sustained policy vision. Today, Ghana imports tomatoes while regions that once fed the nation struggle to sustain basic livelihoods. It does not have to remain this way.
As the proverb goes, “A child who is not embraced by the village will burn it down to feel its warmth.” If we do not reinvest in our farmers, we should not be surprised when they turn elsewhere for survival.
The time for reflection has passed.
What is needed now is action.
The writer is a development communication expert, a former tomato farmer, a journalist, a climate change advocate, and a politician.
By Francis Atayure Abirigo
